

# Bringing Android to Secure SDRs


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**SDR'11 – WinnComm - Europe**

# Agenda

- ❑ Overview – Why Android in SDR?
- ❑ Android Security
- ❑ Proposed Architecture


# Typical red-black architecture for military SDR



HCI is mission-critical and must be trusted and certified; therefore often custom  
Note: Crypto usually on separate discrete but logically “red”

# Why Android in SDR?

- ❑ More sophisticated HCs are desired
  - Powerful GUI for control and management
- ❑ Stay current on technology – avoid expensive custom interfaces
- ❑ Open source licensing
- ❑ Powerful apps environment



# Android Security Today

- ❑ Google Android – G1 released September 22, 2008
  - Oct. 24: NY times reports serious browser vulnerability – from open-source
  - Nov. 6: “Just this week, however, hackers discovered a way to install applications natively on the phone.” ZDNet: “Worst. Bug. Ever.”
  - Nov. 11: "We tried really hard to secure Android. This is definitely a big bug. The reason why we consider it a large security issue is because root access on the device breaks our application sandbox."
- ❑ Lots more since...
  - CVE-2009-2999, -2656: allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application restart and network disconnection)
  - CVE-2009-1754: allows remote attackers to access application data
  - CVE-2009-0608, -0607: buffer overflows with unknown impact
  - CVE-2009-0985, -0986: buffer overflows allow remote attackers to execute arbitrary code


# Android Security Today

## ❑ Android is built on Linux

- Explosive growth in complexity over time
- 20,000 LOC changed per day
- Kernel grew from 5 to 11 Million LOC in 2.6 era
- CVE-2009-2692 - “The Proto-Ops Vulnerability”
  - Trivial user-mode app can take over the system
  - Latent in Linux kernel for 8 years

# Android Security Today

- ❑ “Mobile devices represent the most porous piece of the IT infrastructure”
- ❑ “Like the early days of Web applications, people throwing code together as fast as they can, giving no thought to security”
- ❑ “The more sensitive data you store on that device, the more valuable it is to an attacker”



# What is Secure?

## Common Criteria Security Levels: 1-7

### EAL 4: Windows, Linux, VMware

- “protection against ...inadvertent or casual attempts to breach the system security”
- not for protection “against determined attempts by hostile and well funded attackers to breach system security.”

## EAL 6+ / High Robustness

### Government program to protect secrets


- The most valuable resources exposed to the most sophisticated attackers
- Formal methods, NSA pen testing






# So how do we get Android *and* Security?

- ❑ Secondary red-side processor
  - Extra SWaP-C
- ❑ Better: MILS Virtualization




# Multi-domain Android

- ❑ e.g. Classified and Unclassified in same radio
- ❑ Secondary red-side processor
  - Extra SWaP-C
- ❑ Better: MILS Virtualization, with a small amount of MLS
- ❑ For secret and below, sensitive-but-unclassified, civil/commercial
  - Can do all of this on one SoC (no red-black)



# Is this practical?

- Yes!
  - Intel VT
  - Power.org Embedded Virtualization (Freescale QorIQ)
  - ARM TrustZone and VE
- Most JTRS SDRs already using MILS virtualization
  - INTEGRITY Multivisor with virtualized Linux



# Summary

- ❑ Challenges and Opportunities for SDR
  - Security and real-time required
  - Want powerful Android HCI
    - Android security is poor
- ❑ MILS Virtualization provides the ideal combination
  - Trustworthy OS for
    - SCA
    - Secure boot and crypto management
    - Device authentication
    - Secure device drivers
  - The latest and greatest Android
  - Practical on today's modern SDR microprocessors – ARM, Power, Intel





**Thank You!**