## The Benefits of Static Compliance Testing for SCA Next

**R-Check<sup>™</sup> SCA** 

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## Static Compliance Testing with R-Check<sup>™</sup> SCA

## Outline

#### Introduction to Static Analysis

- What is Static Analysis?
- Capabilities of Static Analysis
- Successes from the State of the Art

#### Static Analysis and the SCA

- Relating the Specification to Testing
- Unique Challenges of the SCA

#### **R-Check SCA**

- Modern Static Analysis Customized to the SCA
- Looking Ahead to SCA Next
- What is Possible ...

## **Introduction to Static Analysis**

#### <u>Static Analysis</u> seeks to *find bugs* through *inspection of source code* rather than through the execution of the program

- Analyzes all possible program paths without bias
- Can be run on code in an intermediate state
- Integrates with development environments

#### What can it do?

- Provide reproducible, automated tests
- Explain specifications, answer "what ifs"
- Generate counter-examples

Static Analysis: Finding bugs through inspection of source code

#### What are the limitations?

• Depending on how specifications are written, some problems are very hard

#### What infrastructure is needed?

• Works best within a tool that can break code down into data-structures

## **Foundations of Static Analysis**

#### G. Kildall – Dataflow Analysis (1973)

- Equations for deriving facts that hold at each program point
- Solution reduces to finding a fixed point over a lattice
- Foundation of modern compiler-driven optimization (e.g., live variable analysis, use-before-def detection)

#### M. Sharir & A. Pnueli – Interprocedural Analysis (1978)

- Extended the equations to support flow through procedures
- Added a level of abstraction to support calling contexts

### E. Clarke, A. Emerson & J. Sifakis – Model Checking (~1981)

- Logical sentences (CTL, LTL, etc.) over abstract labeled transition systems (Kripke Structures)
- 2007 ACM Turing Award

# Field has a deep history with a solid mathematical foundation – not just a bag of tricks!



## Successes from the State of the Art

### Locks over the Linux Kernel (SATURN, Stanford)

- **Precise checking** of lock/unlock sequencing
- Use constraints to model conditional branches
- Found hundreds of previously unknown errors, low false positives

### Counter-Example Guided Abstraction Refinement (CMU)

- Automate the abstraction process for a program
- Finds faults in programs using model checking techniques
- Big leap forward in proving properties about real systems

### Proving Termination (MS Research)

- Provides usable results for an impossible problem!
- Applicable to *liveness* properties what must happen
- *Proving Program Termination*, CACM, May 2011



The Halting Problem: There is always a record that breaks the player

## **Static Analysis for the SCA**

### JTEL SCA 2.2.2 Applications Requirement List

Requirement Tag	Criterion Tag	Requirement/Criterion Text	Section Number	Test Method
AP0603		Applications shall be limited to using the OS services that are designated as mandatory in the SCA Application Environment	3.2.1.1	Manual
		Profile (Appendix B).		

#### Simple – Can be performed with search and inspect

#### • Benefits from a context aware parsing – preprocessor, syntax, library awareness

	AP0604		Applications shall perform file access through the CF File interfaces.	3.2.1.1	Manual
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#### **Deceptive – Simple statement, but non-trivial to test**

#### • Requires an enumeration of what is not allowed – domain & language expertise

	1			
AP0075		The releaseObject operation shall release all internal memory	3.1.3.1.2.5.2.3	Manual
		allocated by the component during the life of the component.		

Holy grail – Reducible to the locking or termination problems

- Simple and intuitive statement really hard to get right
- Balance between eliminating false-negatives, limiting false-positives, speed
- Opens the door to the deepest types of analysis available today

## Why Memory Leaks are Hard

### Lessons from Examples

Memory leaks cannot be found by simply inspecting the memory allocation/deallocation lines

- Context, sequencing matter
- Semantics matter

#### These errors occur in real code

Linux kernel (c.2005)
 Open source –
 thousands of sets of eyeballs –
 hundreds of undiscovered lock bugs

## A safe, conservative analysis *requires* deeper analysis tools

```
Example 1: Memory Leaks through Pointer Reassignment
Component::method_a() {
    p = malloc(...);
    ...
    p = malloc(...);
}
Component::releaseObject() {
    free(p);
```

#### Second malloc() leaks memory allocated by first malloc()

```
Example 2: Memory Leaks through Control Flow
Component::method_a() {
    if (A) {
        p = malloc(...);
    }
}
Component::releaseObject() {
    if (B) {
        free(p);
    }
}
```

If "A" evaluates to true, but "B" does not, then memory allocated by malloc() will be leaked

## Static Analysis for the SCA

## Static Analysis isn't limited to just C/C++ source code

#### SCA 2.2.2 also puts requirements on XML domain profile files ...

AP0613	C174	The devicethatloadedthiscomponentref element refers to a specific	D.6.1.5.1.1.6	Manual
		component found in the assembly, which is used to obtain the		
		logical CF Device that was used to load the referenced component		
		from the CF ApplicationFactory.		
			1	i t

#### May also want to analyze CORBA IDL files ...

• These files define implementation contracts with the source code

#### And check consistency requirements across file types ...

• Profile matches interface description matches implementation

#### Or check non-SCA-specific properties

- Memory leaks, memory/pointer usage
- API usage requirements

## **R-Check SCA**

Goal: Draw from the most successful ideas in static analysis to develop a solution <u>customized to the SCA</u>

#### Version 1.0

- Structure and context aware
- C and C++, POSIX and CORBA support
- Intermediate representation that supports advanced analysis techniques
  - Type system
  - Control-flow abstraction
- Support for XML, CORBA IDL
- Scales to enterprise code
  - Including incomplete/in-development code
- Push-button support for SCA tests

🕙 R-Check Mer	ge Report: source file C:/cvsroot/n185/n07-185/rcheck/src/host_envir.c - Mozilla Fir 📒	
<u>File E</u> dit ⊻iew	History Bookmarks Tools Help	
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2584	<pre>len1 = strlen(strl);</pre>	^
2585	<pre>len2 = str2 == NULL ? 0 : strlen(str2); if ((len1 + len2 + (int)(len2 != 0)) &gt; 8) {</pre>	
2586 2587	/* The string (not including the file name) is longer than 8	
2588	characters. Use a CRC of the string instead. */	
2589	unsigned long crc;	
2590	crc = crc 32(strl, (unsigned long)0);	
2591	if (len2 != 0) crc = crc 32(str2, crc);	
2592 AP0603	<pre>sprintf(crc_buf, "%081x", crc);</pre>	
2593	strl = crc_buf;	
2594	lenl = 8;	
2595	str2 = NULL;	
2596	len2 = 0;	
2597	} /* if */	
2598	/* Exclude the directory portion of the file name. */	
2599	{ char *end_of_dir;	
2600 2601	<pre>end_of_dir = end_of_directory_name(file_name); if (end of dir != NULL) file_name = end of dir+1;</pre>	
2602	<pre>if (end_of_dir (= work) file_name = end_of_dir+1; }</pre>	
2603	; file name len = strlen(file name);	
2604	/* The file name is preceded by its length enclosed in underscores. */	
2605 AP0603	(void)sprintf(len buf, " %lu ", (unsigned long)file name len);	
2606	module id = alloc general(strlen(len buf) + file name len + 1 +	
2607	<pre>len1 + len2 + (int)(len2 != 0) + 1);</pre>	
2608	(void)strcpy(module_id, len_buf);	
2609 AP0603	<pre>(void)streat(module_id, file_name);</pre>	
2610 AP0603	<pre>(void)streat(module_id, "_");</pre>	
2611 AP0603	<pre>(void)streat(module_id, str1);</pre>	
2612	if (str2 != NULL) {	
2613 AP0603 2614 AP0603	<pre>(void)streat(module_id, "_"); (void)streat(module_id, str2);</pre>	
2614 AP0603 2615	<pre>/* if */</pre>	_
2615	/* Change non-identifier characters to " ". */	
2617	change non id characters(module id);	
2618	}	
2619	#if DEBUG	
2620	if (db_flag_is_set("module_id")) {	
2621	fprintf(f_debug, "make_module_id: final string = %s\n", module_id);	
2622	} /* if */	
2623	<pre>#endif /* DEBUG */</pre>	
2624	} /* if */	
2625	return module_id;	
2626	<pre>} /* make_module_id */</pre>	
2627	fendif /* HODULE ID NEEDED */	
2628	*endri / nobors_in_mends "/	~
2629 Done		S3Fox
Durie		SSFUX

R-Check HTML report for the SCA AP0603 core POSIX requirement (SCA 2.2.2. App B)

## **R-Check SCA Workflow**



## **Looking Ahead to SCA Next**

## We expect static testing to become an even more integral component in SCA Next certification

#### New Challenges making Dynamic Analysis Harder

- More flexibility in interface (e.g., CORBA vs. no-CORBA)
- More flexibility in capability supported
- Data hiding component interfaces behind Domain Manager

#### **Opportunities**

• Static testing tool can be used to "teach" the specification with each compile operation

#### Providing meaningful guarantees requires an accord among

- **Specification authors**: What the specification says
- Testers: Tools available (time vs. precision), what can be tested
- **Developers**: How code is written

## What is Possible

## SCA Next

- R-Check SCA architecture extends to SCA Next
- SCA Profiles
- Support for Platform Specific Model
- Retain push-button functionality

## **Deeper Analyses**

- Add flow and path-sensitivity, more precision
- Supported by R-Check SCA architecture

## **Direct Query Interface**

- Write new analyses using structured natural-language syntax
- Motivated by model-checking ideas (logic sentences)
- Ask questions about what the radio might do



Static Analysis: Find & eliminate bugs earlier in the process

## **About Reservoir Labs**

Privately owned, Reservoir Labs has been providing leading-edge consulting and contract R&D to the computer industry, business, end-users, and the US Government since 1990

### Expertise

- Custom verification solutions
- Applied *compiler research* for emerging high-performance and embedded architectures
- Reasoning, *constraint solving*, and mathematics
- Cyber-security, deep network content inspection

## Technologies

- *R-Check* Static Analysis Platform
- *R-Stream* Mapping Compiler
- *R–Solve* Reasoning and Planning Technology
- *R–Scope* Network Security Technology





Reservoir Labs' offices in New York, NY and Portland, OR

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## For More Information on R-Check SCA

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